Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
8 - Are Central Banks Too Independent?
CBI and Democracy after the Crises
from Part III - The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2024
Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 8 adds to a clarification of the confusion about CBI by discussing the need for transparency and accountability in light of a growing – mainly political science driven – literature on the perceived democratic deficit of technocratic policy solutions. We show that this literature overlooks important aspects of CBI.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence , pp. 196 - 207Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024