Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Foreword
- Introduction
- Part I Facts and forms
- Part II Motives
- Part III Values and reasons
- Part IV The economics of reciprocity
- 17 General methodology of reciprocity analysis
- 18 The theory of comparative, matching, or balance reciprocity
- 19 The theory of liking reciprocity
- 20 Strategic interaction and process preferences: games of reciprocity
- 21 General properties of processes
- 22 Solutions of reciprocity games; comparisons
- 23 Reciprocity in the understanding of society and its economy
- Bibliography
- Index
20 - Strategic interaction and process preferences: games of reciprocity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Foreword
- Introduction
- Part I Facts and forms
- Part II Motives
- Part III Values and reasons
- Part IV The economics of reciprocity
- 17 General methodology of reciprocity analysis
- 18 The theory of comparative, matching, or balance reciprocity
- 19 The theory of liking reciprocity
- 20 Strategic interaction and process preferences: games of reciprocity
- 21 General properties of processes
- 22 Solutions of reciprocity games; comparisons
- 23 Reciprocity in the understanding of society and its economy
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Objects of preferences
Given possible motives and their relations with actions, there remains, to explain reciprocity, to consider the effects of the interaction of the participants that leads them to the choice of actions. In so choosing, participants often take into account their anticipation of others' reaction. Thus, they consider the thinking of others, and they may have to consider what others think they themselves think. This gives a game-theoretic form to the interaction leading to the choices of actions. In addition, people also often directly care about the nature of the intentions, attitudes, judgments and views of others, notably concerning themselves. And they also have judgments about their own intentions, attitudes, judgments, and views towards others. This is notably important for most genuine reciprocities. It is self-evident for reciprocities based on liking, but it also holds for the balance or fairness of balance reciprocity. Hence, the strategic game-theoretic dimension of the relation is not only present but also correspondingly enriched by these other concerns. Therefore, beyond the general properties of game theory, there will be major differences with other games, due to the type of motives and concerns. These specific properties of games of reciprocity influence both the preferences and the concepts of solution (in the sense of game theory) – as will shortly be seen.
These motives refer to social relations, which determine a type of process for the interaction such as, notably, a type of reciprocity, a purely self-interested exchange, or imposition by force.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- ReciprocityAn Economics of Social Relations, pp. 283 - 289Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008