Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Basic Game Theory
- Part I Indirect Reciprocity
- Part II Evolutionary Games
- Part III Sequential Decision-Making
- 11 Introduction to Sequential Decision-Making
- 12 Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Static Systems
- 13 Dynamic Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Dynamic Systems
- 14 Indian Buffet Game for Multiple Choices
- 15 Hidden Chinese Restaurant Game: Learning from Actions
- 16 Wireless Network Access with Mechanism Design
- 17 Deal Selection on Social Media with Behavior Prediction
- 18 Social Computing: Answer vs. Vote
- Index
16 - Wireless Network Access with Mechanism Design
from Part III - Sequential Decision-Making
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Basic Game Theory
- Part I Indirect Reciprocity
- Part II Evolutionary Games
- Part III Sequential Decision-Making
- 11 Introduction to Sequential Decision-Making
- 12 Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Static Systems
- 13 Dynamic Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Dynamic Systems
- 14 Indian Buffet Game for Multiple Choices
- 15 Hidden Chinese Restaurant Game: Learning from Actions
- 16 Wireless Network Access with Mechanism Design
- 17 Deal Selection on Social Media with Behavior Prediction
- 18 Social Computing: Answer vs. Vote
- Index
Summary
Network service acquisition in a wireless environment requires the selection of a wireless access network. A key problem in wireless access network selection is studying rational strategies that consider negative network externality. In this chapter, we formulate the wireless network selection problem as a stochastic game with negative network externality and show that finding the optimal decision rule can be modeled as a multidimensional Markov decision process. A modified value-iteration algorithm is utilized to efficiently obtain the optimal decision rule with a simple threshold structure. We further investigate the mechanism design problem with incentive compatibility constraints, which force the networks to reveal truthful state information. The formulated problem is a mixed-integer programming problem that, in general, lacks an efficient solution. Exploiting the optimality of substructures, we introduce a dynamic programming algorithm that can optimally solve the problem in the two-network scenario. For the multinetwork scenario, the dynamic programming algorithm can outperform the heuristic greedy approach in polynomial-time complexity.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021