Fichte's work, and especially his emphasis on the self's activity, has been receiving considerable attention recently, and even in America important philosophers have made claims that it points to significant improvements on Kant's philosophy. Elsewhere I have challenged some of these claims, in particular as they bear on a precise understanding of the central notion of the activity of apperception, and on the detailed interpretation of some key passages in Fichte regarding the “primacy of the practical.” On this occasion, I will present a somewhat broader view of the transition from Kant to Fichte, while expanding on my reading of this period as marked by a premature move toward a radical kind of “practical” foundationalism.

After stepping back briefly to sketch a very general picture of the peculiar context and impact of the early reception of Kant (sec. I.1), I will review the Critical texts most relevant for explaining the basic features of Fichte's reaction and the popularity of positions like Fichte's in our own time (sec. I.2). From this interpretive perspective I will then draw some critical implications for evaluating an important account of this period developed recently by Allen Wood (sec. II). Whereas Wood presents Fichte as improving in places on Kant's program, I will offer reasons for regarding Fichte's reaction as an understandable but questionable departure from the Critical philosophy.

The immediate reaction to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, second edition 1787) was highly unusual.