Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T00:18:26.965Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

46 - Evolution of Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Brian Skyrms
Affiliation:
University of California; Stanford University
Jonathan E. Adler
Affiliation:
Brooklyn College, City University of New York
Lance J. Rips
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Get access

Summary

Philosophical Skepticism

Jean-Jacques Rousseau begins his discussion of the origin of language in A Discourse on Inequality by toying with a paradox:

[A] substitution of voice for gesture can only have been made by common consent, something rather difficult to put into effect by men whose crude organs had not yet been exercised; something indeed, even more difficult to conceive of having happened in the first place, for such a unanimous agreement would need to be proposed, which means that speech seems to be absolutely necessary to establish the use of speech.

Rousseau moves on without taking the problem seriously, but the paradox echoes through modern philosophy of language. How can we explain the genesis of speech without presupposing speech, reference without presupposing reference, meaning without presupposing meaning? A version of this paradox forms the basis of Quine's attack on the logical empiricist doctrine that logic derives its warrant from conventions of meaning – that logical truths are true and logical inferences are valid by virtue of such conventions. Quine raised the general skeptical question of how conventions of language could be established without preexisting language, as well as calling attention to more specific skeptical circularities. If conventions of logic are set up by explicit definitions, or by axioms, must we not presuppose logic to unpack those conventions?

Type
Chapter
Information
Reasoning
Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations
, pp. 927 - 933
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., and Sprinkle, G. B. (2001) “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest.” Games, and Economic Behavior 37: 79–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cheney, D., and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Crawford, V., and Sobel, J. (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50: 1431–1451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Darwin, C. (1882) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2nd. ed. New York: D. Appleton.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
England, R. R., Hobbs, G., Bainton, N. J., and Roberts, D. McL. (1999) Microbial Signalling and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Evans, C. S., Evans, C. L., and Marler, P. (1994) “On the Meaning of Alarm Calls: Functional Reference in an Avian Vocal System.” Animal Behavior 73: 23–38.Google Scholar
Hauser, M. D. (1997) The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kavanaugh, M. (1980) “Invasion of the Forest by an African Savannah Monkey: Behavioral Adaptations.” Behavior 73: 238–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Smith, Maynard J., and Parker, G. (1976) “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests.” Animal Behavior 24: 159–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Maynard J., and Price, G. (1973) “The Logic of Animal Conflicts.” Nature 246: 15–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rousseau, J. (1984) A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. M. Cranston. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schuster, P., and Sigmund, K. (1983) “Replicator Dynamics.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 100: 535–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, B. (1999) “Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.” Philosophy of Science 67: 94–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, B. (2000) “Evolution of Inference.” In Dynamics of Human and Primate Societies. Ed. Kohler, T. and Gumerman, G.. New York: Oxford University Press, 77–88.Google Scholar
Smith, A. (1761) “Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages.” Reprinted in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Ed. Bryce, J. C. (1983). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201–226.Google Scholar
Taylor, P., and Jonker, L. (1978) “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wärneryd, K. (1993) “Cheap Talk, Coordination and Evolutionary Stability.” Games and Economic Behavior 5: 532–546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×