Evolution of Inference

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814273.048

46 - Evolution of Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012

Brian Skyrms

Edited by

Jonathan E. Adler and

Lance J. Rips

Show author details

Brian Skyrms: Affiliation:
University of California; Stanford University
Jonathan E. Adler: Affiliation:
Brooklyn College, City University of New York
Lance J. Rips: Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois

Book contents

Get access

Summary

Philosophical Skepticism

Jean-Jacques Rousseau begins his discussion of the origin of language in A Discourse on Inequality by toying with a paradox:

[A] substitution of voice for gesture can only have been made by common consent, something rather difficult to put into effect by men whose crude organs had not yet been exercised; something indeed, even more difficult to conceive of having happened in the first place, for such a unanimous agreement would need to be proposed, which means that speech seems to be absolutely necessary to establish the use of speech.

Rousseau moves on without taking the problem seriously, but the paradox echoes through modern philosophy of language. How can we explain the genesis of speech without presupposing speech, reference without presupposing reference, meaning without presupposing meaning? A version of this paradox forms the basis of Quine's attack on the logical empiricist doctrine that logic derives its warrant from conventions of meaning – that logical truths are true and logical inferences are valid by virtue of such conventions. Quine raised the general skeptical question of how conventions of language could be established without preexisting language, as well as calling attention to more specific skeptical circularities. If conventions of logic are set up by explicit definitions, or by axioms, must we not presuppose logic to unpack those conventions?

Type: Chapter
Information: Reasoning
Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations
, pp. 927 - 933

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814273.048 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., and Sprinkle, G. B. (2001) “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest.” Games, and Economic Behavior 37: 79–120.CrossRef Google Scholar

Cheney, D., and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Crawford, V., and Sobel, J. (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50: 1431–1451.CrossRef Google Scholar

Darwin, C. (1882) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2nd. ed. New York: D. Appleton.CrossRef Google Scholar

England, R. R., Hobbs, G., Bainton, N. J., and Roberts, D. McL. (1999) Microbial Signalling and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Evans, C. S., Evans, C. L., and Marler, P. (1994) “On the Meaning of Alarm Calls: Functional Reference in an Avian Vocal System.” Animal Behavior 73: 23–38.Google Scholar

Hauser, M. D. (1997) The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Kavanaugh, M. (1980) “Invasion of the Forest by an African Savannah Monkey: Behavioral Adaptations.” Behavior 73: 238–260.CrossRef Google Scholar

Lewis, D. K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

Smith, Maynard J., and Parker, G. (1976) “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests.” Animal Behavior 24: 159–179.CrossRef Google Scholar

Smith, Maynard J., and Price, G. (1973) “The Logic of Animal Conflicts.” Nature 246: 15–18.CrossRef Google Scholar

Rousseau, J. (1984) A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. M. Cranston. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar

Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Schuster, P., and Sigmund, K. (1983) “Replicator Dynamics.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 100: 535–538.CrossRef Google Scholar

Skyrms, B. (1999) “Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.” Philosophy of Science 67: 94–113.CrossRef Google Scholar

Skyrms, B. (2000) “Evolution of Inference.” In Dynamics of Human and Primate Societies. Ed. Kohler, T. and Gumerman, G.. New York: Oxford University Press, 77–88.Google Scholar

Smith, A. (1761) “Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages.” Reprinted in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Ed. Bryce, J. C. (1983). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201–226.Google Scholar

Taylor, P., and Jonker, L. (1978) “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145–156.CrossRef Google Scholar

Wärneryd, K. (1993) “Cheap Talk, Coordination and Evolutionary Stability.” Games and Economic Behavior 5: 532–546.CrossRef Google Scholar