At first sight the concept of rational behaviour does not seem too problematic, at least when looked at as primarily involving the effective pursuit of goals. Amongst the problems of this viewpoint are two which are of particular concern in this study. First, problems quickly appear as one tries to extend conceptually simple procedures, which work well enough in an impersonal world, to conflict between strategic human beings. The theory of games has been put forward as a basis in which the concept of rational behaviour can be applied to conflict behaviour. There are limitations even here, and the ‘solutions’, beloved of the true-believing games theorist, are either nonexistent or highly contrived even in some simple and applicable cases. Problems and paradoxes are quickly reached in trying to apply simple concepts of rationality to conflict behaviour. Nevertheless, stylised conflicts can be related to the ‘real’ conflicts which pervade the international system, and the conceptual underpinnings of issues such as deterrence can be examined.

Secondly, rational choice theory often proceeds as if the goals people pursue were unproblematic. While we like to think of ourselves as rational, the issues become more complex as we delve deeper and emotions cease to become an optional extra but are a central issue.