Book contents
- Public Reason and Courts
- Studies on International Courts and Tribunals
- Public Reason and Courts
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Taking Public Reason to Court: Understanding References to Public Reason in Discussions about Courts and Adjudication
- Part I Public Reason in Constitutional Courts
- 2 Must Laws Be Motivated by Public Reason?
- 3 The Importance of Constitutional Public Reason
- 4 The Question of Constitutional Fidelity: Rawls on the Reason of Constitutional Courts
- 5 The Challenges of Islamic Law Adjudication in Public Reason
- 6 “We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident”: Constitutionalism, Public Reason, and Legitimate Authority
- 7 A Kantian System of Constitutional Justice: Rights, Trusteeship, Balancing
- 8 Laws, Norms, and Public Justification: The Limits of Law as an Instrument of Reform
- Part II Public Reason in International Courts and Tribunals
- Part III Critical Perspective on Public Reason in Courts
- Index
2 - Must Laws Be Motivated by Public Reason?
from Part I - Public Reason in Constitutional Courts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2020
- Public Reason and Courts
- Studies on International Courts and Tribunals
- Public Reason and Courts
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Taking Public Reason to Court: Understanding References to Public Reason in Discussions about Courts and Adjudication
- Part I Public Reason in Constitutional Courts
- 2 Must Laws Be Motivated by Public Reason?
- 3 The Importance of Constitutional Public Reason
- 4 The Question of Constitutional Fidelity: Rawls on the Reason of Constitutional Courts
- 5 The Challenges of Islamic Law Adjudication in Public Reason
- 6 “We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident”: Constitutionalism, Public Reason, and Legitimate Authority
- 7 A Kantian System of Constitutional Justice: Rights, Trusteeship, Balancing
- 8 Laws, Norms, and Public Justification: The Limits of Law as an Instrument of Reform
- Part II Public Reason in International Courts and Tribunals
- Part III Critical Perspective on Public Reason in Courts
- Index
Summary
When courts exercise judicial review, should they invalidate laws that are not motivated by public reason? For proponents of public reason, a standard response might be that laws not motivated by public reason are impermissible under the liberal principle of legitimacy. But this response must confront the permissibility objection, which holds that a law’s motivation is irrelevant to its moral permissibility. Against this objection, this chapter defends a motivational requirement for purposes of judicial review. In some cases, an agent’s motivation can be relevant to the permissibility of the agent’s actions. This chapter also argues that laws with mixed motives, both nonpublic and public, may be permissible, but courts have reason to give such laws careful scrutiny in determining whether they are publicly justified.
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- Public Reason and Courts , pp. 45 - 65Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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