Public Forgiveness: a Modest Defence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2020
Summary
In the wake of initiatives by Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, there was a surge of interest in the idea that forgiveness could play a constructive role in political life and help to prevent cycles of violence. Of late, there has been considerable skepticism about that notion, with some even suspecting Tutu of boosterism about the notion of forgiveness. The grounds for that skepticism are important to consider and set the theme for this book. I do not claim to address all relevant arguments against the notion of public forgiveness; rather, I will attempt here to counter major logical and ethical objections. I argue that there is a viable concept of public forgiveness, one that is defensible in the context of fundamental philosophical criticisms. Although public forgiveness may be difficult to achieve, I believe that it is worth seeking and should not be dismissed as theoretically ill-founded or practically impossible.
The topic of public forgiveness has been of interest mainly due to its connection with another topic, that of reconciliation between groups and individuals alienated in the aftermath of bitter conflict or repression. Reconciliation requires the establishment of social trust between previously opposed factions – enough social trust so that they can cooperate as needed to coexist in a decent society. This account of reconciliation in terms of trust is not a minimalist account, based simply on coexistence without violence. Rather, it requires the development of attitudes facilitating cooperation between former enemies. Nor is it a maximalist account: it does not require warm emotion, apologies and tears of remorse – but instead enough social trust and good will for formerly alienated people to function together within social institutions. Wilhelm Verwoerd and I argued for such an account in a 2002 paper on trust and national reconciliation and I developed it further in my book, Taking Wrong Seriously, published in 2006.
For the purposes of this discussion, I define forgiveness as follows:
Forgiveness requires:
a. The overcoming of resentment and bad feelings towards a person or persons believed to have accountably committed serious wrongs in the past;
b. The re-framing or shift in attitude toward such persons so as to regard them as capable of engaging in decent relationships in the present and future;
c. The setting of the wrongful deeds in the past.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Public Forgiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts , pp. 25 - 36Publisher: IntersentiaPrint publication year: 2012