Background

Consider three formulations of what is often referred to as the basic psychological rule of distributive justice, which were expressed over a time span ranging from antiquity to the present. “Justice involves at least four terms, namely two persons for whom it is just and two shares which are just. And there will be the same equality between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares will be equal to the ratio between the persons; for if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares” (Aristotle, 1967, p. 269). In a more contemporary formulation, Jouvenel (1957, p. 149) stated similarly that what people “find just is to preserve between men as regards whatever is in question the same relative positions as exist between the same men as regards something else”. Homans (1961, p. 249) expressed this rule somewhat more formally, as follows: “Distributive justice involves a relationship between … two persons, P1 and P2, one of whom can be assessed as higher than, equal to, or lower than, the other; and their two shares, or … rewards, R1 and R2. The condition of distributive justice is satisfied when … : P1/P2 = R1R2”. Similar models were suggested by Adams (1965), Anderson (1976), and Walster, Berscheid, & Walster (1973).