Book contents
- Predatory Lending and the Destruction of the African-American Dream
- Predatory Lending and the Destruction of the African-American Dream
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Foreclosure: At What Cost and to Whom?
- 3 Predatory Lending Practices Prior to the Global Financial Crisis
- 4 Predatory Lending Targeted African Americans
- 5 The Implications of the Collapse of the Mortgage-backed Securities Market for Consumer Borrowers
- 6 A Missed Opportunity
- 7 Financial Crisis Reforms Woefully Inadequate
- 8 Incomplete Justice: Legal Actions against Predatory Lenders
- 9 A Sub-prime Loan by Any Other Name Is Just as Predatory
- 10 “Forgiveness” rather than Forbearance or Foreclosure
- Appendix
- Index
7 - Financial Crisis Reforms Woefully Inadequate
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 June 2020
- Predatory Lending and the Destruction of the African-American Dream
- Predatory Lending and the Destruction of the African-American Dream
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Foreclosure: At What Cost and to Whom?
- 3 Predatory Lending Practices Prior to the Global Financial Crisis
- 4 Predatory Lending Targeted African Americans
- 5 The Implications of the Collapse of the Mortgage-backed Securities Market for Consumer Borrowers
- 6 A Missed Opportunity
- 7 Financial Crisis Reforms Woefully Inadequate
- 8 Incomplete Justice: Legal Actions against Predatory Lenders
- 9 A Sub-prime Loan by Any Other Name Is Just as Predatory
- 10 “Forgiveness” rather than Forbearance or Foreclosure
- Appendix
- Index
Summary
Chapter 7 explores other reforms implemented, ostensibly in response to the crisis, suggesting that the federal government’s efforts to protect homeowners were well intentioned but ineffective for millions of borrowers. The post-crisis reforms aimed ostensibly at relieving hardship for home borrowers created a new set of incentives for lenders and brokers to exploit mortgage holders. Ultimately, consumer mortgage borrowers paid dearly - financially, socially, emotionally, and physically for the decision by legislators to bail out banks and other financial institutions rather than direct some of those substantial resources to millions of borrowers whose homes were lost. Regulators allowed the programs to be administered by the very predatory lenders that had created the problems. The statute that was ultimately enacted did not assist families in saving their homes. It encouraged, but did not require, lenders to modify loan terms, and did not require them to reduce any principal owing.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020