At the beginning of this book I observed that my main concern was to work out what followed from our existence as social creatures for practical reasoning in general, rather than what followed specifically for morality. I have, however, attempted at various points to relate my discussion to moral thinking, if only because moral thinking is so pervasive. Thus, in chapter 3 I suggested that there was as much reason to ascribe moral responsibility to collectivities as there was to ascribe it to individuals, and I suggested that collectivities could be objects of moral concern in similar ways to individuals. In the present chapter I attempt to relate earlier discussion to moral thinking more systematically. I entertain the suggestion that morality has a pre-eminent role in questions of practical reasoning and, without attempting to settle whether the suggestion is correct, I call attention to some of the questionable presuppositions on which it rests, note the diversity of roles which morality plays, and indicate some of the difficulties in forming a vocabulary consistent with the suggestion until we are sure that it is correct. I also point out a number of respects in which our thinking about morality may be affected by the conclusions of earlier chapters. This includes a return to the idea of pure collective identification discussed in chapter 4, section 5, and a consideration of its relation to the polarity of altruism and self-interest.