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11 - Third-Party Policymakers and the Limits of the Influence of Indicators

from Part IV - Skeptical Voices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2020

By
Melissa M. Lee  and
Aila M. Matanock
Edited by
Judith G. Kelley  and
Beth A. Simmons
Judith G. Kelley
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Beth A. Simmons
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

Do Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) influence the application of material power? While existing research has shown that GPIs can provoke reform through social mechanisms, material power is an important tool for influencing states resistant to social pressure. We investigate whether GPIs shape third-party policymakers’ decisions to employ material power in the fight against corruption, an important component of the good governance agenda. We theorize that GPIs influence policymakers by acting as focal points that provide information and establish standards of behavior. We test this argument for a highly visible GPI: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. We find that while this GPI garners significant media attention, it does not influence policymakers’ decisions to punish corruption offenders by withdrawing or altering foreign aid. Our results raise important scope conditions on the power of GPIs and suggest that their ability to alter state behavior through third-party material mechanisms may be limited.

Keywords

indicatorsrankingsratingsmetricsforeign aidcorruptionpowerTransparency Internationalstate fragilityshamingCorruption Perceptions Index
Type
Chapter
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The Power of Global Performance Indicators , pp. 341 - 374
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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