Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Associations: An Overview
- 3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- 4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- 5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength
- 6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- 7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- A Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview
- B Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- C Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- D Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- E Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 July 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Associations: An Overview
- 3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- 4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- 5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength
- 6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- 7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- A Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview
- B Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- C Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- D Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- E Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 7 first summarizes the book and assesses the conditions under which government threats will motivate private good governance. The second half of the chapter considers the policy implications of the book’s findings. It proposes that private governance – and, in turn, economic development – is best supported not by an absentee state or by massive state intervention in trade. Rather, a middle ground is ideal. It argues that regardless of one’s assumptions about how economic growth in private groups shapes the broader economy, since private groups control a massive portion of most economies, growth within these groups is important for its own sake.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Politics of Order in Informal MarketsHow the State Shapes Private Governance, pp. 110 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021