Book contents
- The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process
- The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Diamonds after Blood?
- 2 The Domestic Political Economy of International Agreements
- 3 From Passiveness to the Presidency
- 4 Diamonds, Dependence, and De Beers
- 5 The One Who Controls the Diamond Wears the Crown
- 6 The Limits of Cooperation after Conflict?
- 7 No Private Companies = No Compliance
- 8 Understanding the Nature of the Kimberley Process and International Agreements
- Works Cited
- Index
7 - No Private Companies = No Compliance
The Crisis of the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2020
- The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process
- The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Diamonds after Blood?
- 2 The Domestic Political Economy of International Agreements
- 3 From Passiveness to the Presidency
- 4 Diamonds, Dependence, and De Beers
- 5 The One Who Controls the Diamond Wears the Crown
- 6 The Limits of Cooperation after Conflict?
- 7 No Private Companies = No Compliance
- 8 Understanding the Nature of the Kimberley Process and International Agreements
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
Understanding the ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic is essential to assessing the Kimberley Process, a global diamond certification scheme that originated in 2003 to stop the trade in conflict diamonds. More evident than in any other country, diamonds have contributed to the conflict in the Central African Republic after the Kimberley Process was implemented. Thus, examining the influence of the Kimberley Process on the conflict in the Central African Republic is crucial to understanding whether the agreement is useful in its original goal of preventing conflict diamonds from entering the market. The existence of private diamond companies with preferences that are in line with Kimberley Process regulations are a necessary condition for Kimberley Process compliance. Unlike most diamond-producing states, large diamond mining companies have not been present in the Central African Republic. Thus compliance with the Kimberley Process has been minimal, even in comparison to other similar African states. The lack of feasibility in enforcing the monolithic regulatory framework brought about by the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic demonstrates that the Kimberley Process is ill-suited to preventing diamonds from funding conflict in this case.
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- Information
- The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process , pp. 138 - 157Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020