Policy Shock Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises
Book contents
- Policy Shock
- Policy Shock
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The Conceptual Terrain of Crises and Risk Perceptions
- Part II Case Studies on Offshore Oil Spills
- Part III Case Studies on Nuclear Accidents
- Part IV Case Studies of Financial Crises
- 13 Regulatory Responses to the Financial Crises of the Great Depression
- 14 Financial Decommodification
- 15 Euro Area Risk (Mis)management
- 16 The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis
- Part V Conclusions
- Index
- References
13 - Regulatory Responses to the Financial Crises of the Great Depression
Britain, France, and the United States
from Part IV - Case Studies of Financial Crises
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2017
Book contents
- Policy Shock
- Policy Shock
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The Conceptual Terrain of Crises and Risk Perceptions
- Part II Case Studies on Offshore Oil Spills
- Part III Case Studies on Nuclear Accidents
- Part IV Case Studies of Financial Crises
- 13 Regulatory Responses to the Financial Crises of the Great Depression
- 14 Financial Decommodification
- 15 Euro Area Risk (Mis)management
- 16 The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis
- Part V Conclusions
- Index
- References
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- Information
- Policy ShockRecalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises, pp. 347 - 348Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
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