As befits a volume devoted to the topic of pluralism the contributing pieces collected here are varied. Their concern is with very different kinds of difference, and their conclusions range from an insistence that pluralism is both inevitable and desirable to a belief that it is unsustainable and perhaps remediable. The starting point for any discussion of pluralism is a recognition that we inhabit a world of differences. These differences are exhibited in moral outlooks, cultural identities, ways of life, religious beliefs, and even modes of philosophy. The mere fact of such differences is salient but unremarkable. What preoccupies philosophers is the question of the conclusions that are to be drawn from a proper recognition of this fact. And the central issue at dispute for philosophers is whether the fact of difference—plurality—licences a view—pluralism—that it is legitimate, rather than just inevitable, that such difference should persist.

It simplifies but does not necessarily exaggerate matters to suggest that philosophers are torn between two impulses. On the one hand, there is the conviction that the goal of philosophical argumentation is convergence upon a single agreed answer. Truth is one, and so too, it has been felt, is the good. Difference is a sign of failure, evidence that mistakes have been made somewhere by someone. To maintain otherwise is inconsistent with how one must understand the nature of truth or morality.