The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. Public choice theorists themselves divide over the question of whether turnout can be considered a rational decision. As my paraphrase of Gerald Kramer's comment illustrates, some of the very best theorists think it unlikely, to say the least, though many others have sought for some satisfactory means to conclude the opposite (e.g., Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974). The stakes are high. Voting is perhaps the most common and the most important action considered by citizens in a democracy. If such a common and important decision faced by ordinary people cannot be understood as “rational,” then how can our complex theories of politics, public choice, and even economics stand, if based on such infirm ground? As arcane and complicated as public choice accounts of voting can be, the fundamental problem is really quite simple. Hegel, not often considered a major contributor to public choice theory, put the problem clearly.