Stakeholders and the legal theory of the corporation

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511770456.010

9 - Stakeholders and the legal theory of the corporation

from PART 1 - Perspectives in company law, SECTION 2: Corporate governance, shareholders' rights and auditing

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010

Peter Nobel

Edited by

Michel Tison ,

Hans De Wulf ,

Christoph Van der Elst and

Reinhard Steennot

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Michel Tison: Affiliation:
Universiteit Gent, Belgium
Hans De Wulf: Affiliation:
Universiteit Gent, Belgium
Christoph Van der Elst: Affiliation:
Universiteit Gent, Belgium
Reinhard Steennot: Affiliation:
Universiteit Gent, Belgium

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Summary

Introduction

It is a pleasure for me to write for the lively Eddy, always full of a variety of fertile thoughts, combining eloquence with rapidity. He has worked and published many learned treatises on the law of corporations and the field of finance, which has become more and more integrated in the study of corporations. This is because the capital markets need the producers of their ‘deal objects’ and continuously try to reshape these objects according to their wishes. For Eddy, I shall endeavour to go off the beaten track in search of a better theory of the corporation. My proposal also contains an incomplete inventory of areas where the science of corporate law is somewhat mired down.

Phenomenological analysis

The notion of a ‘stakeholder’

When I am unsure about the exact meaning of a word like ‘stake’, I consult the Oxford English Dictionary, bearing in mind that a mad professor has made many contributions to it.

A ‘stake’ is essentially a pole to which something is attached; historically, it might be a convicted person condemned to death by fire or other means, but when I hear ‘stakeholder’ I initially think of a situation of gaming where an independent party holds the prize money. This meaning is then extended to a person who holds an interest or concern in something, especially a business.

Type: Chapter
Information: Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation , pp. 165 - 182

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511770456.010 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2009

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