Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Technical note
- 1 Europe and Russia after the war
- 2 Approaching the Russian problem
- 3 From Cannes to Boulogne
- 4 Diplomatic preliminaries
- 5 Soviet Russia and Genoa
- 6 The conference opens
- 7 Rapallo
- 8 Closing stages
- 9 Genoa and after
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
9 - Genoa and after
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Technical note
- 1 Europe and Russia after the war
- 2 Approaching the Russian problem
- 3 From Cannes to Boulogne
- 4 Diplomatic preliminaries
- 5 Soviet Russia and Genoa
- 6 The conference opens
- 7 Rapallo
- 8 Closing stages
- 9 Genoa and after
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
The conference and its achievements were subject to a close scrutiny in press, parliamentary and political circles over the months that followed. It was impossible to disguise the fact that its direct results had been distinctly modest, at least when set against the aspirations of those who had inspired it. Even Lloyd George, addressing the British House of Commons on 25 May 1922, was unable to go so far as to pronounce the conference a success. It had been probably the largest gathering of nations that had ever assembled in the history of the world, he told the House, and despite their previous differences, the thirty-four nations represented had met in perfect calm and in perfect harmony. Their aim had been to restore financial and trade relations, to improve diplomatic contacts, and to remove the disputes which were threatening the peace of Europe. The problem that had aroused the most controversy in this connection had been the Russian question. There were three possible courses of action in relation to Russia, the prime minister suggested. The first of these, force, had been tried and failed, and had not been suggested at Genoa by even the most anti-Soviet delegations. Another possibility was to leave Russia to her own devices until a more acceptable form of government had emerged, and to ignore her vast and destitute population. The third possibility was what Lloyd George called the ‘Pitt policy’, in other words that abhorrence of the principles on which a foreign government might stand should not preclude relations with it and thereby with the people over whom it ruled.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Origins of DetenteThe Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921–1922, pp. 192 - 211Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1985