In this chapter, Alfano argues that the Nietzschean virtues discussed earlier in the book (curiosity, intellectual courage, pathos of distance, sense of humor, solitude) cleave together. In particular, many instances of expressing one of them will also count as expressions of at least one other. This means that there is a modest, person-type-relative unity to the Nietzschean virtues. Alfano explores this unity via the notions of conscience and ingtegrity in Nietzsche's writings. To possess integrity or be integrated, on this view, is to enjoy harmony among one's drives. Such harmony is largely a matter of luck, but it can be steered toward agency, so Nietzsche considers integration an achievement. It's what happens when someone becomes who they are. Alfano shows that if we distinguish conscience simpliciter from good conscience, bad conscience, and intellectual conscience, it becomes possible to make sense of Nietzsche's thoughts about conscience and its relation to the virtues.