The Potsdam Conference holds a rather hazy place in American memory. This last of the three wartime conferences of the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States took place in the latter half of July 1945 in the Berlin suburb from whence it drew its name. Details of the conference agreements are shrouded in a fog of ignorance and even capable historians rarely present Potsdam as an especially memorable affair. The greatest drama associated with it rests in it having supposedly served as the venue for atomic diplomacy. Yet, a close examination of the conference deliberations reveals an American effort, spearheaded by the new Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, but bearing Truman's endorsement, to negotiate something approaching “a spheres of influence peace.” As Marc Trachtenberg astutely emphasized, Potsdam constituted an important step toward the division of Europe “as the basis of the postwar international order.” Such a division was not the painful consequence of the failure of negotiations but the very object and culmination of these negotiations. Byrnes led the way at Potsdam in tough bargaining with the Soviets designed to settle some of the major issues that the victorious powers confronted, in particular the future of Germany. Understanding the Byrnes-Truman approach at Potsdam is essential for grasping the real nature of American diplomacy at this crucial time.