In Chapter 2 we followed the development of Blumer's methodology, critically noting a number of problems. In this chapter I want to press the criticism a little further by relating selected themes in Blumer's thought to a broader philosophical discussion. At issue here is the overall meaning and tenability of Blumer's methodological project.

Beyond look-and-see empiricism

We shall begin the critical extensions by addressing sequentially three questions, for Blumer's mistaken answers (implicit or explicit) to these questions bear heavy responsibility for misleading him.

1. Does the vocabulary of a workable scientific language admit to full semantic reduction to experiential givens?

2. If not, what is the role of that language which is semantically nonreducible?

3. What is the epistemological status of the nonreducible language?

Swan song for reductive semantics. The first question, whether the vocabulary of a workable scientific language can be semantically reduced to the givens of experience, is fruitfully addressed by considering the development of logical positivism. This positivism sprang boldly upon the scene with a simple prescription for curing the ills of philosophy. According to Rudolph Carnap, the advances in “applied logic,” whose aim is to clarify the cognitive content of scientific statements by means of logical analysis, had led to a positive and a negative result. On the positive side, the concepts of science are clarified in that their “formal–logical and epistemological connections are made explicit.”