Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Louis Phlips: a brief biography
- Introduction
- 1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case
- 2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy
- 3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem
- 4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping
- 5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude?
- 6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities?
- 7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game
- 8 Product market competition policy and technological performance
- 9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets
- 10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models
- 11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition
- 12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets
- Index
7 - The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Louis Phlips: a brief biography
- Introduction
- 1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case
- 2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy
- 3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem
- 4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping
- 5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude?
- 6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities?
- 7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game
- 8 Product market competition policy and technological performance
- 9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets
- 10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models
- 11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition
- 12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Why might a firm sell its product at prices less than marginal cost? If each firm posts its price in advance of learning its demand, the quantity demanded could exceed the maximum quantity a firm wishes to supply when competitors charge higher than expected prices or demand is strong. Such a firm then faces a choice of whether to ration its customers or to serve all demand. There are many reasons why a firm might forgo the strategy of short-run profit maximisation and serve all demand. Among them are encouraging shopping by consumers who buy both advertised and unadvertised goods, maintaining a positive reputation with consumers, and inducing risk-averse consumers with significant shopping costs to seek out low prices by removing the risk of finding the store stocked out.
Some firms effectively commit to serve all demand by offering ‘rainchecks’. Many supermarket chains in the United States issue coupons to consumers to buy items advertised at special prices when the super-market runs out of its supply. The consumer can then return after the store restocks and obtain the product at the special price. Trade deals with manufacturers often enable stores to offer special low prices, so offering to sell the good after the sale period at the low price is an offer to sell at a price below marginal cost. While maintaining goodwill is an obvious explanation, there are at least two others. First, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates advertising.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Market Structure and Competition PolicyGame-Theoretic Approaches, pp. 143 - 160Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000