THE evident failure of the idealist theory to satisfy the demands of consciousness seemed to throw men back upon a belief in matter; but with this difference, that whereas, before, that belief had been supposed to be warranted by the reasoning powers, then it was recognised to be, at least to a certain extent, in opposition to them. The true existence of material things was to be believed on the basis of consciousness, and in spite of certain logical deductions from premisses that were still to be maintained. From this position, two things necessarily follow: first, that consciousness must be affirmed to give certain knowledge; and secondly, that our faculties must be held incompetent to discuss the true nature of the world. For, it is argued, if consciousness do not give us certainty, how can we attain certainty at all? and if our faculties be not incompetent, how is it that they contradict that which nevertheless we must believe?

This is the present position of philosophy. It is engaged in a struggle to maintain the authority of consciousness. But can this task be achieved? To assert the authority of consciousness is one thing; truly to maintain it, another. It is difficult to see what argument can be had recourse to, at last, but this, that God would not let us be under illusion.