Scientists who want to reconstruct the past often use presently existing things as models for things that no longer exist. For example, since we cannot observe the social lives of our Pleistocene ancestors, one suggestion is to treat existing hunting and gathering societies as models. Since we cannot observe dinosaurs, we might use living birds and mammals as biomechanical models. Up to now I have been arguing that historical science finds itself at a relative disadvantage, because (a) we cannot manipulate the past, and (b) historical processes destroy information about the past. But maybe these disadvantages are counterbalanced by another special advantage: the ready availability of observable analogues for prehistoric entities and events.

THE ANALOGUE ASYMMETRY

Although he does not use this terminology, Christián Carman (2005) calls attention to another potentially relevant difference between the past and the tiny. Picking up on an argument from Rom Harré (1986; 1996), Carman suggests that while there are plenty of observable analogues for past things, events and processes, there are few if any observable analogues for microphysical things, events, and processes. The particles and processes described by quantum theory are so wildly different from any of the middle-sized dry goods that we encounter in ordinary life, that scientists cannot safely use observable things and events as a guide to the ontology of the microphysical universe. On the other hand, the plants, animals, and natural processes that we can observe on Earth today are not so radically different from past living things and processes.