Thus far, I have argued that conditionality of repression is a key determinant of whether cartels respond to state crackdowns with increased or decreased violence. Part I lays out several logics of anti-state violence, showing how unconditional crackdowns give cartels increased incentives for anti-state violence, and arguing that conditionality of repression could counter these incentives and induce cartels to eschew violence. Part II presents case-study evidence supporting my theory: unconditional crackdowns tended to trigger or exacerbate cartel–state conflict, while turns toward conditionality seem to have had strong, violence-reducing effects. The case studies also provided descriptive narratives of the efforts of reformers that, to differing degrees in each case, succeeded in in raising the conditionality of repression.

The natural next step is to turn our attention back to the state and ask why and when leaders adopt unconditional versus conditional policies in the first place. Indeed, given the success of conditional approaches where they have been tried, one might wonder why they have not been adopted more universally.

Of course, leaders may not understand the potential for unconditional repression to spark cartel–state conflict, or they may simply not prioritize min- imizing violence. Both factors probably played some role in the unconditional nature of initial state crackdowns on cartels and subsequent “doubling down.”