Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- PART I THE CONTEXT
- PART II THE MODEL
- PART III EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
- 6 Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–1993
- 7 Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization
- 8 Exploring the model: A comparative perspective
- 9 A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation
- PART IV APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
- References
- Index
8 - Exploring the model: A comparative perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- PART I THE CONTEXT
- PART II THE MODEL
- PART III EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
- 6 Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–1993
- 7 Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization
- 8 Exploring the model: A comparative perspective
- 9 A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation
- PART IV APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
Thus far we have elaborated our model, set out some of its implications for coalition formation in the real world, explored these implications in a couple of particular settings, and discussed how these implications can be more generally evaluated using data that are actually available to us. We are now in a position to look in a more systematic manner at how well the model seems to capture important features of the making and breaking of real governments. We do this by determining whether each of the cabinets in our dataset conforms to each of the theoretical implications of our model set out in Chapter 7.
Using our data for each government formation situation that we consider, we use Winset to calculate which of the possible cabinets that could have formed were consistent with the theoretical implications of our model. Since, out of very many cabinets that could possibly have formed, our model typically identified rather few as potential equilibriums, if the actual cabinet that formed was one of these equilibrium cabinets identified by our model, we regard this as an empirical “success.”
Furthermore, since every day in politics is one in which the incumbent government must survive in the face of the possibility of being brought down, every day is in a sense a new government formation situation. If the parameters of the situation change in such a way that the incumbent government is no longer equilibrium, then our model implies that the government should change. We thus consider the duration over which the theoretical implications of our model are fulfilled in each case.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Making and Breaking GovernmentsCabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies, pp. 158 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996