Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Aristotle on the Necessity of the Consequence
- 2 Aristotle on One- Sided Possibility
- 3 Why Does Aristotle Need a Modal Syllogistic?
- 4 Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought
- 5 Necessity in Avicenna and the Arabic Tradition
- 6 Modality without the Prior Analytics: Early Twelfth Century Accounts of Modal Propositions
- 7 Ockham and the Foundations of Modality in the Fourteenth Century
- 8 Theological and Scientific Applications of the Notion of Necessity in the Mediaeval and Early Modern Periods
- 9 Locke and the Problem of Necessity in Early Modern Philosophy
- 10 Leibniz's Theories of Necessity
- 11 Leibniz and the Lucky Proof
- 12 Divine Necessity and Kant's Modal Categories
- 13 Charles Sanders Peirce on Necessity
- 14 The Development of C. I. Lewis's Philosophy of Modal Logic
- 15 Carnap's Modal Predicate Logic
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Modality without the Prior Analytics: Early Twelfth Century Accounts of Modal Propositions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Aristotle on the Necessity of the Consequence
- 2 Aristotle on One- Sided Possibility
- 3 Why Does Aristotle Need a Modal Syllogistic?
- 4 Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought
- 5 Necessity in Avicenna and the Arabic Tradition
- 6 Modality without the Prior Analytics: Early Twelfth Century Accounts of Modal Propositions
- 7 Ockham and the Foundations of Modality in the Fourteenth Century
- 8 Theological and Scientific Applications of the Notion of Necessity in the Mediaeval and Early Modern Periods
- 9 Locke and the Problem of Necessity in Early Modern Philosophy
- 10 Leibniz's Theories of Necessity
- 11 Leibniz and the Lucky Proof
- 12 Divine Necessity and Kant's Modal Categories
- 13 Charles Sanders Peirce on Necessity
- 14 The Development of C. I. Lewis's Philosophy of Modal Logic
- 15 Carnap's Modal Predicate Logic
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Peter Abaelard's birth around 1079 coincided with the promulgation by Pope Gregory VII of a decree instructing his bishops to ensure that all clerics were trained in the liberal arts, and Abaelard's life was shaped by the consequent increase in the number and importance of teaching masters. These early twelfth century teachers commented on the works of what would later be called the logica vetus, including from Aristotle only the Categories and De Interpretatione. Abaelard also had some access to the Sophistical Refutations and, indeed, seems to have known a little about the Prior Analytics. The latter work, however, played no role in the development of thinking about modal propositions in the period to be considered here. Rather it was Aristotle's remarks on the proper placing of the negative particle in forming the contradictory of a given modal proposition in de Interpretatione 12, and 13, and a distinction made by Boethius between different forms of modality in his De Syllogismis Hypotheticis that prompted early twelfth century philosophers to investigate the nature of modal propositions.
Ancient Sources
The general problem for the De Interpretatione is to characterise the logical relationship of opposition in truth-value. Aristotle has no notion of negation as a propositional operator and proceeds, rather, syntactically, to consider where the negative particle is to be inserted into each form of categorical proposition to produce the desired opposite. This leads him in chapters 12 and 13 to the question of the proper negations of, and logical relations between, propositions involving nominal modes. For the Latin writers we are to consider here these are propositions such as ‘(For) Socrates to be a man is possible’ (‘Possibile est Socratem esse hominem’) and ‘(For) Socrates not to be a stone is necessary’ (‘Necesse est Socratem non esse lapidem’). Aristotle holds that negation is an operation on terms which takes the narrowest possible scope. For modalities this entails, he concludes, that it must be applied to the modal adjective to yield, for example, ‘not necessary to be’ as the negation of ‘necessary to be’. In chapter 13 of De Interpretatione he summarises his results in a set of four tables of equipollent combinations of mode and quality which were the starting point of early twelfth century discussions of modal sentences.
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- Logical Modalities from Aristotle to CarnapThe Story of Necessity, pp. 113 - 132Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
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