It is by now familiar to distinguish moral theories according to whether their basic principle or principles are formulated in terms of goals, rights, or duties. Consequentialist theories are goal-based in this sense, though consequentialists have often argued that nonbasic moral rights or duties can be derived from a basic goal-promotion principle. Within this framework, Alan Donagan's account of common or Judeo-Christian morality is duty-based. He takes the fundamental principle of morality to be, “It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature.” First-order precepts are as well duties, specifically, those concerned with the taking of human life and, in particular, absolute duties: “No man may at will kill another,” “It is impermissible to kill an innocent human being,” or, finally, “It is absolutely impermissible to commit murder.” The duty regarding killing concerns both killing oneself as well as killing another, though Donagan specifies several qualifications to the prohibition of suicide. I will argue here that, in making the basic moral principle regarding taking human life both a duty and absolute, Donagan is led to an unacceptable moral position regarding the taking of human life. His position is subject to some criticisms commonly made by consequentialists and to others associated with rights-based views, each of which points to what I believe is a more acceptable position on this issue.