Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T20:02:52.606Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Theories of compensation

from Part III - Risk, compensation, and torts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2009

Get access

Summary

From a moral point of view, the function of compensation is straightforward. Compensation serves to right what would otherwise count as wrongful injuries to persons or their property. That is the role of ‘compensatory damages’ in the law of torts. That is the role of ‘just compensation’ paid in return for the public taking of private property, pursuant to the state's power of eminent domain. That is what the New Welfare Economists are relying upon when making the possibility of gainers compensating losers the proper measure of permissible policies.

It would, however, be wrong to presume that we as a society can do anything we like to people, just so long as we compensate them for their losses. Such a proposition would mistake part of the policy universe for the whole. The set of policies to which it points – policies that are ‘permissible, but only with compensation’ – is bounded on the one side by a set of policies that are ‘permissible, even without compensation’ and on the other side by a set of policies that are ‘impermissible, even with compensation’.

There clearly are some things that we as a society can do to people without compensating them in any way for their ensuing losses. This is familiar to American constitutional lawyers through, eg, the distinction between actions arising under the state's ‘police power’ and those arising under the state's ‘takings power’.

Type
Chapter
Information
Liability and Responsibility
Essays in Law and Morals
, pp. 257 - 289
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×