Book contents
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2022
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I claim that of the vast panoply of “external controls” existing or imagined more than two centuries ago, only the “periodic vote” endured over time. More significantly, I maintain that periodic vote was left on its own, that is, unassisted by any of a whole battery of instruments that might accompany the vote in the first (actual or imagined) republican systems (like the ones studied in chapter 7). In its resulting solitude -I claim- the vote lost much of its meaning and, above all, its power. How to hold accountable dozens of representatives, onhundreds of issues, for so long, with a single vote? And how to do all that (or somehow introduce some rationality into the system) without even a remote possibility of nuanced messaging to convey any message not on the ballot that any individual, sensibly and austerely, may want to transmit to their political officials?
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- The Law As a Conversation among Equals , pp. 108 - 123Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022