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6 - God, Lions, and Englishwomen: Wittgenstein on Understanding People

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2024

Severin Schroeder
Affiliation:
University of Reading
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Summary

If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of. (PPF §284)

If a lion could talk we wouldn't be able to understand it. (PPF §327)

It is important for our approach, that someone may feel concerning certain people that he will never know what goes on inside them. He will never understand them. (Englishwomen for Europeans.) (CV 84 [MS 137, 71; 9.7.1948])

The inner-object conception

The concept of understanding occurs in Wittgenstein's writings first and mainly with respect to language. Understanding is discussed as a correlative to meaning and explanation. Wittgenstein argues against the idea of understanding as an inner process or occurrence – a mental representation of what is understood. Locke presented the view that words have meaning if they are accompanied by a mental image ‘in the mind of him that uses them’ (Locke 1690, 3.2.2). Understanding would then require that the same words are associated with the same images in the mind of the hearer. A little reflection shows, however, that what comes before our minds when we understand a word – a picture or mental image – cannot determine or constitute our understanding of the word, for the same mental image can accompany the hearing of a word in two people when they understand the word very differently (PI §140). They may, for example, both imagine an Alsatian when one of them takes the word in question to mean ‘dog’, while the other understands it to mean ‘Alsatian’. Similarly, the same mental image can accompany our understanding of completely different words, which we know to be different in meaning: thus the word ‘winter’ may make me see the image of a snow-covered street, but the same image may come up in my mind when I hear the words ‘snow’ or ‘Advent’. On the other hand, very often, when I use or understand the word ‘winter’, no such mental imagery occurs (cf. PI §449). Mental images are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of understanding.

Conceding that our words are not always accompanied by mental images, one may still be inclined to insist that understanding must consist in some sort of mental representation, whatever it may be. When I understand that something is the case, it would appear that the object of my understanding must somehow be represented in my mind.

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Chapter
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Language, Mind, and Value
Essays on Wittgenstein
, pp. 75 - 86
Publisher: Anthem Press
Print publication year: 2024

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