Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: opening up options
- Part I Language, development and evolution
- Introduction to part I
- 2 Thought before language: the expression of motion events prior to the impact of a conventional language model
- 3 The prerequisites for language acquisition: evidence from cases of anomalous language development
- 4 Some thoughts about the evolution of LADS, with special reference to TOM and SAM
- 5 Thinking in language? Evolution and a modularist possibility
- Part II Language, reasoning and concepts
- Part III Language and conscious reasoning
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
5 - Thinking in language? Evolution and a modularist possibility
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: opening up options
- Part I Language, development and evolution
- Introduction to part I
- 2 Thought before language: the expression of motion events prior to the impact of a conventional language model
- 3 The prerequisites for language acquisition: evidence from cases of anomalous language development
- 4 Some thoughts about the evolution of LADS, with special reference to TOM and SAM
- 5 Thinking in language? Evolution and a modularist possibility
- Part II Language, reasoning and concepts
- Part III Language and conscious reasoning
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
Introduction: the modular mind
This chapter will attempt to develop a modularist version of (a relatively weak form of) the cognitive conception of language (weak, because it only claims it to be naturally necessary that some of our thoughts should constitutively involve natural language – see chapter 1, where we point out that one obstacle to taking the cognitive conception of language seriously, amongst cognitive scientists, is an unnecessary focus on conceptual and/or universal versions of it). In my 1996a I argued at length in support of the cognitive conception of language, and responded to a variety of objections to it. I also regarded it as important to claim that the cognitive conception could be consistent with a more or less modular conception of language and mind; but the idea was not really spelled out, and the consistency not demonstrated. The purpose of this chapter is to remedy that deficiency. I should stress, however, that the main point of the chapter is to defend a possibility – I want to show how it is possible for modularism and the cognitive conception of language both to be true together, so that others may begin to investigate the possibilities. I make no attempt to present anything resembling a defence of a worked-out model of cognition. But first I need to give some background.
According to Jerry Fodor's (1983) account, the human mind is cleanly divided into two distinct aspects or parts – into a set of peripheral input (and output) modules, on the one hand, and central cognition on the other.
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- Language and ThoughtInterdisciplinary Themes, pp. 94 - 120Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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