Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- 1 Feasibility
- 2 Elicitation for games
- 3 Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
- 4 Rational choice in the context of ideal games
- 5 Hyperrational games: Concept and resolutions
- 6 Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
- 7 Tortuous labyrinth: Noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
- 8 On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
- 9 Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
- 10 Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
- 11 Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic
- 12 Epistemic logic and game theory
- 13 Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses
- 14 Representing facts
- 15 Introduction to metamoral
- 16 The logic of Ulam's games with lies
- 17 The acquisition of common knowledge
- 18 The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”
- 19 Knowledge-dependent games: Backward induction
- 20 Common knowledge and games with perfect information
- 21 Game solutions and the normal form
- 22 The dynamics of belief systems: Foundations versus coherence theories
- 23 Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
14 - Representing facts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- 1 Feasibility
- 2 Elicitation for games
- 3 Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
- 4 Rational choice in the context of ideal games
- 5 Hyperrational games: Concept and resolutions
- 6 Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
- 7 Tortuous labyrinth: Noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
- 8 On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
- 9 Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
- 10 Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
- 11 Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic
- 12 Epistemic logic and game theory
- 13 Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses
- 14 Representing facts
- 15 Introduction to metamoral
- 16 The logic of Ulam's games with lies
- 17 The acquisition of common knowledge
- 18 The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”
- 19 Knowledge-dependent games: Backward induction
- 20 Common knowledge and games with perfect information
- 21 Game solutions and the normal form
- 22 The dynamics of belief systems: Foundations versus coherence theories
- 23 Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
Summary
Without the concept of action there would be no social science. Much work can be (and is) done without a detailed examination of this concept, but ultimately there is a need for a full conceptual analysis of action. Even though philosophers are already addressing that task, work of a more formal nature is still in its infancy. In this chapter some suggestions toward a formal analysis of action are offered, in the belief that philosophical work of this kind ought eventually to result in formal modelings.
We take our lead from Georg Henrik von Wright, to whom we should like to attribute the insight contained in the slogan “to act is to bring about a fact.” As a first step, then, one ought to analyze the notion of a fact; this is attempted in the first five sections, the bulk of this chapter. The last two sections contain some suggestions – sketchy, to be sure – for how a theory of action, in the spirit of von Wright, might be based on our analysis of facts.
FACTS ACCORDING TO VON WRIGHT
When a (contingent) proposition is true there corresponds to it a fact in the world. It is a well-known view that truth ‘consists’ in a correspondence between proposition and fact.
This observation was made by von Wright in his book Norm and Action ([14], p. 25), and he went on to distinguish three types of fact: states-of-affairs, events, and processes.
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- Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction , pp. 239 - 256Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992
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