INTRODUCTION

It is central to Kant's moral philosophy that one should always treat other human beings with respect. He articulates this requirement in his formula of humanity as an end-in-itself, which he calls the supreme limiting condition of one's freedom: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’ (G IV 429, cf. IV 430 ff.) However, the exact reason why one should respect others remains a matter of debate. The standard view in the Kant literature is that one should respect others because of an absolute inner worth or value all human beings possess. The absolute value is often called ‘dignity’, and dignity is said to be the reason why one should respect others. The debate focuses on the question whether human beings have this value or dignity in virtue of a pre-moral capacity they have (such as freedom or the capacity to set ends), or because of a morally good will. Against the standard view I shall argue that Kant does not ground the requirement to respect others on any value at all. Rather, one should respect others because it is commanded by the categorical imperative. While this claim is not novel, what is new is my argument that the formula of humanity passage (G IV 427–9) supports this claim.