Book contents
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the Edition and Translation
- Chronology of the Translated Texts and Kant’s Major Works
- Abbreviations
- Historical and Systematic Introduction
- I Freedom and Determinism
- II Freedom and Imputability
- III Freedom and Consciousness
- Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, “On Freedom,” Berlin, 1788
- Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, “On Moral Freedom,” in Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion, Volume ii, Leipzig, 1791, 56–69
- Johann Heinrich Abicht, “On the Freedom of the Will,” Neues Philosophisches Magazin 1, Part I(III), (Leipzig, 1789), 64–85
- IV Freedom and Skepticism
- V Freedom and Choice
- Appendix: Biographical Sketches
- Glossary
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Persons
- Index of Subjects
Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, “On Freedom,” Berlin, 1788
from III - Freedom and Consciousness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2022
Book contents
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the Edition and Translation
- Chronology of the Translated Texts and Kant’s Major Works
- Abbreviations
- Historical and Systematic Introduction
- I Freedom and Determinism
- II Freedom and Imputability
- III Freedom and Consciousness
- Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, “On Freedom,” Berlin, 1788
- Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, “On Moral Freedom,” in Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion, Volume ii, Leipzig, 1791, 56–69
- Johann Heinrich Abicht, “On the Freedom of the Will,” Neues Philosophisches Magazin 1, Part I(III), (Leipzig, 1789), 64–85
- IV Freedom and Skepticism
- V Freedom and Choice
- Appendix: Biographical Sketches
- Glossary
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Persons
- Index of Subjects
Summary
Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob claims in his 1788 “On Freedom” that we know we are free by virtue of our self-consciousness. Drawing broadly on Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason, Jakob asserts that freedom is a fact. However, Jakob does not claim that this fact is furnished by consciousness of the moral law. Instead it is immediately given through inner sense. This supposedly parallels how we know that a body is distinct from us because our consciousness of it as given through outer sense entails that it does not belong to our self.
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- Kant's Early Critics on Freedom of the Will , pp. 119 - 126Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022