Religion and Subjectivity

In part four of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant states his more or less official definition of religion: “Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands” (RBMR, 6:153; cf. MM, 6:443). To be religious, for Kant, is to view all of one's duties as commands issued to oneself by God. Kant's wording of this definition, apparently restricting the definition to religion “subjectively considered,” might suggest that there could be another, “objective” way of considering religion, and this “objective” consideration might present a different definition of religion. But in fact Kant never offers a definition of that sort. In fact, Kant had already put forward the same official definition in part three in the following words: “Religion is the moral disposition (Gesinnung) to observe all duties as [God's] commands” (RBMR, 6:105). There is no suggestion here that this is a definition of only one kind of religion, to which another kind might be opposed. Instead, there is only a further emphasis on the subjectivity of all religion (as consisting in a special kind of “moral disposition”).