The present work is a study in the nature and meaning of justice in theological ethics. More particularly, it is concerned primarily with the relations of justice to virtue and law. In view of the renewed attention to virtue both in theological and in philosophical ethics, we turn, first, to the attempt to define justice fundamentally in terms of virtue. Do writers in the tradition of virtue themselves maintain that justice can be adequately understood as virtue, or do they also appeal to certain rules – or laws – to establish criteria of justice in human communities? If justice includes both law and virtue, how are the latter ideas related? Finally, how is the demand for justice ultimately grounded? Is justice, indeed, a viable concept in modern pluralistic society?

JUSTICE BASED ON VIRTUE

In an effort to explore these questions we begin with three contemporary ethicists who have attempted to ground morality in public life fundamentally upon the notion of virtue. The first of these writers – Alasdair Maclntyre – is a philosopher; the remaining two – Stanley Hauerwas and James M. Gustafson – are theologians. While each is deeply influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas, all three fail to give adequate attention to the relation of justice to law both in Aristotle and Aquinas, but particularly in Aquinas. The ensuing section of the present chapter is devoted to an analysis of the structures of justice as a requirement of collective forms of human life.