Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 The Military Role of the Order of the Garter
- 2 The Itineraries of the Black Prince's Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations
- 3 The Chevauchée of John Chandos and Robert Knolles: Early March to Early June, 1369
- 4 “A Voyage, or Rather an Expedition, to Portugal:” Edmund of Langley's Journey to Iberia, June/July 1381
- 5 The Battle of Aljubarrota (1385): A Reassessment
- 6 “Military” Knighthood in the Lancastrian Era: The Case of Sir John Montgomery
- 7 Medieval Romances and Military History: Marching Orders in Jean de Bueil's Le Jouvencel introduit aux armes
- 8 Arms and the Art of War: The Ghentenaar and Brugeois Militia in 1477–79
- 9 Accounting for Service at War: The Case of Sir James Audley of Heighley
- 10 The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–56), According to MS78 of Corpus Christi College, Oxford
- Journal of Medieval Military History Volumes I–VI
3 - The Chevauchée of John Chandos and Robert Knolles: Early March to Early June, 1369
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 The Military Role of the Order of the Garter
- 2 The Itineraries of the Black Prince's Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations
- 3 The Chevauchée of John Chandos and Robert Knolles: Early March to Early June, 1369
- 4 “A Voyage, or Rather an Expedition, to Portugal:” Edmund of Langley's Journey to Iberia, June/July 1381
- 5 The Battle of Aljubarrota (1385): A Reassessment
- 6 “Military” Knighthood in the Lancastrian Era: The Case of Sir John Montgomery
- 7 Medieval Romances and Military History: Marching Orders in Jean de Bueil's Le Jouvencel introduit aux armes
- 8 Arms and the Art of War: The Ghentenaar and Brugeois Militia in 1477–79
- 9 Accounting for Service at War: The Case of Sir James Audley of Heighley
- 10 The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–56), According to MS78 of Corpus Christi College, Oxford
- Journal of Medieval Military History Volumes I–VI
Summary
The chevauchée conducted by John Chandos and Robert Knolles in the spring of 1369 is known to us, in its broad outlines, through the account of it presented by Jean Froissart in his chronicles. The details, the military objectives, and the tactics of this operation, however, remain less than clear. Historians have shown little interest in it. Guillaume Lacoste, in the brief narrative contained within his monumental Histoire générale de la province de Quercy, often contradicts both Froissart and the archival documents regarding the chronology of the operation, which proves that he did not devote sustained attention to the campaign. A closer look makes it clear that although the objectives assigned to John Chandos and Robert Knolles were of very great importance, the results did not match the expectations, so that their expedition fell into the obscurity reserved for grand enterprises concluded without success.
In order to define properly the goals of this chevauchée, it is necessary to situate it correctly in the general context of the troubled events of the years 1368–69. This done, it will be possible to take into account its strategic objectives and the role that was expected for it, and thereby to observe the mismatch between the operation and the mission it was intended to fulfill. Finally, the study of the actions taken by the French in opposition to it will show that they possessed a clear awareness of the Anglo-Aquitanian objectives, and that they had taken them fully into account as they launched their riposte. This first major military action of the resumption of Anglo-French conflict bore within itself the factors which explain the future successes of the armies of Charles V.
General Political Context
Since the conclusion of the treaty of Brétigny in 1360, Quercy, like Poitou, Saintonge, the Agenais, Périgord, the Limousin, Bigorre, the Angoumois and Rouergue, had been living under English domination, and had been integrated into the principality of Aquitaine, under the rule of the prince of Wales. The people of Quercy endured this subjugation with resignation. It was not that they felt any more-or-less “nationalistic” aversion to Plantagenet power, but the Treaty of Brétigny, which had separated them from the authority of the king of France, had not brought with it the peace and the return to prosperity they so longed for: mercenary companies continued to live off the land, and the economic situation remained abysmal.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Journal of Medieval Military HistoryVolume VII: The Age of the Hundred Years War, pp. 38 - 56Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2009