Chapter 7 traces the rise to power of Binyamin Netanyahu and the ‘presidential’ decision-making structure he established to bypass his ministerial colleagues whom he regarded as his rivals. It explores key events, including the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel, the October 1996 Washington summit, the signing of the revised Hebron agreement, the construction in Har Homa/Jabal Abu-Ghneim, and the protracted delay in the implementation of the Oslo II agreement. The chapter provides new information concerning the decision-making process in relation to each of these events. In addition, it exposes, for the first time, that Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected an offer from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to replace the Oslo process with Madrid peace conference negotiation framework, which Likud was a part of. It is argued that Israel’s foreign policy reflected Prime Minister Netanyahu’s fundamental opposition to Israel’s engagement foreign policy stance, which he successfully frustrated.