Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abstracts
- Preface
- Editors' Note
- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER?
- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE
- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS
- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS
- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART VII OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
- 20 Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace (2003)
- 21 Trade: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002)
- 22 Money: The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (2000)
- 23 War Crimes: Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2001)
- 24 Human Rights: The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe (2000)
- 25 Environment: Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (1994)
- 26 Intellectual Property: The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources (2004)
- References
- Index
21 - Trade: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abstracts
- Preface
- Editors' Note
- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER?
- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE
- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS
- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS
- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART VII OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
- 20 Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace (2003)
- 21 Trade: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002)
- 22 Money: The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (2000)
- 23 War Crimes: Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2001)
- 24 Human Rights: The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe (2000)
- 25 Environment: Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (1994)
- 26 Intellectual Property: The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources (2004)
- References
- Index
Summary
International organizations use one or a combination of three types of decision-making rules for most non-judicial action: “majoritarian” (decisions are taken by a majority vote of member states, and each member has one vote); “weighted voting” (decisions are taken by a majority or super-majority, with each state assigned votes or other procedural powers in proportion to its population, financial contribution to the organization, or other factors); or “sovereign equality.” Organizations with these latter rules – which are rooted in a notion of sovereign equality of states derived from natural law theory and later adopted by positivists and others – formally negate status, offer equal representation and voting power in international organizations, and take decisions by consensus or unanimity of the members. Organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Executive Committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GATT/WTO, Common Market of the South, Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and many specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN), including the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the Executive Committee of the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), usually have taken decisions only with the consensus or unanimous support of member states. These organizations employ a host of procedures (described below) that purport to respect the sovereign equality of member states.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- International Law and International RelationsAn International Organization Reader, pp. 543 - 567Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007