There is currently a prevailing sense of concern among the World Trade Organization (WTO) community of nations that they are witnessing an ignominious end to a dispute settlement system that has thrived for a quarter century. While the precipitous fall from grace for this treasure of the WTO is certainly the result of a network of factors, the proximate cause is relatively clear: an increasingly antagonistic and aggressive orientation taken by the United States (U.S.) – arguably, the center of gravity of world trade flows – toward the system. While there are many examples of the U.S.’s changed posture, two are particularly notable: (i) the U.S. invocation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXI security exception in defense of a steep increase in steel and aluminum tariffs, and (ii) its active refusal to fill vacated Appellate Body member seats. Each action unto itself is a broadside attack capable of rendering the current dispute settlement scheme obsolete. The two in combination form an aura of inevitability with respect to that outcome.