Book contents
- Injury and Injustice
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- Injury and Injustice
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Injury and the Construction of Legal Subjects
- Part II Constructing Injury and Imagining Remedies
- Part III Inequality and/as Injury
- Chapter Ten Injury Inequality
- Chapter Eleven The Unconscionable Impossibility of Reparations for Slavery; or, Why the Master's Mules Will Never Dismantle the Master's House
- Chapter Twelve Inflicting Legal Injuries
- Chapter Thirteen The State as Victim
- Chapter Fourteen Law's Imperial Amnesia
- Conclusion
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- References
Chapter Eleven - The Unconscionable Impossibility of Reparations for Slavery; or, Why the Master's Mules Will Never Dismantle the Master's House
from Part III - Inequality and/as Injury
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2018
Book contents
- Injury and Injustice
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- Injury and Injustice
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Injury and the Construction of Legal Subjects
- Part II Constructing Injury and Imagining Remedies
- Part III Inequality and/as Injury
- Chapter Ten Injury Inequality
- Chapter Eleven The Unconscionable Impossibility of Reparations for Slavery; or, Why the Master's Mules Will Never Dismantle the Master's House
- Chapter Twelve Inflicting Legal Injuries
- Chapter Thirteen The State as Victim
- Chapter Fourteen Law's Imperial Amnesia
- Conclusion
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- References
Summary
The history of legal advocacy for slavery reparations is a history of failure. Slaves and their descendants have repeatedly sought compensation for the horrific harms inflicted on them. These efforts, beginning even before the end of slavery and continuing to the present day, have often employed the language and tools of law. And yet, over the 150 years since the end of slavery, no compensation has been paid; the fabled “forty acres and a mule” were never delivered. This chapter discusses the curious unwillingness of the legal system to provide compensation for the harms of slavery. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the failure of law in this area—the impossibility of reparations—is no accident. Rather, the legal system is doing what it was always designed to do. Law itself is a social construct designed by societal elites to protect elite interests, and the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Injury and InjusticeThe Cultural Politics of Harm and Redress, pp. 248 - 266Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
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