Book contents
- Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations and central terms
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The State of the Art
- 2 Approaches to Inconsistency in the Philosophy of Science
- 3 Approaches to Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Part II Paraconsistency
- Part III Plausible Argumentation
- Part IV Summary
- References
- Index
2 - Approaches to Inconsistency in the Philosophy of Science
from Part I - The State of the Art
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 June 2022
- Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations and central terms
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The State of the Art
- 2 Approaches to Inconsistency in the Philosophy of Science
- 3 Approaches to Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising
- Part II Paraconsistency
- Part III Plausible Argumentation
- Part IV Summary
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter outlines the ways in which the philosophy of science handles the problem of inconsistency in scientific theorising. After raising this problem in ,will summarise the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science (SVI). In , we will touch on the break with the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science as initiated by Kuhn and continued by Lakatos and Laudan.will discuss the most recent trends that re-evaluate the emergence and the presence of inconsistencies in scientific theorising.will draw the conclusions that serve as guidelines for the next steps of our train of thought.
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- Information
- Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising , pp. 9 - 29Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022