Introduction

The fullest philosophical reflection on the Noahide law emerges in the thought of Maimonides. Before turning to Maimonides, let us quickly recount the development of Noahide law to this point.

The rabbinic treatment of the Noahide laws eventually led to the assumption of their a priori universal status. We have seen that the ger toshav long preceded that of the Noahide. The latter implied that a gentile's obligation to obey a certain number of Torah laws was based on one's humanity per se, irrespective of whether one accepted Jewish legal authority. The earlier concept seems to presuppose some form of conversion as the basis of gentile obligation. The later concept saw the obligation as universal. Thus it required a definition of universal human obligation not required by the earlier concept.

As regards the earlier concept, the question, “when is there gentile obligation for Noahide law?” is easily answered: “the obligation is subsequent to the acceptance of Jewish political rule.”However, if the gentile's obligation is conceived of as based on his human status, then the question about obligation is not so easily answered. For it is easier to point to a particular agreement than to define a universal status. Clearly, then, the later concept leads to philosophical reflection more immediately than the earlier concept.

The difference in philosophical significance between the two can be seen when we ask the second fundamental question about Noahide law, “how do gentiles know their obligation?” Again, the earlier concept admits an easy answer: “gentiles know their obligation when they accept Jewish political rule and its legal authority.” However, the later concept does not admit such an easy answer. Here one must discover an obligation that already obliges everyone prior to its acceptance by any individual. Thus, here again, the development of Jewish law and theology immediately leads us to the type of questions with which philosophers deal.

The Locus Classicus of Maimonides’ Philosophy of Law

Maimonides contends directly with two questions: (1) Why is there gentile obligation? And (2) How do gentiles know their obligation? His treatment of these questions presupposes the point developed in rabbinic tradition, namely, that Noahide law is universally binding even before its acceptance by any particular gentile.