MANEUVERING ROOM IN POLITICS

The concept of politics as rational action was defined in the introductory chapter of this study in two steps: first, as the ability of politicians to rank their preferences; and second, as the ability to act strategically – that is, to maneuver in such a way that as many of their preferences as possible can be realized at the present time, without thereby diminishing their long-term prospects.

On the basis of this definition, we have been able to follow our politicians as they have used strategic action to further their own positions on a number of major controversial issues in Sweden during the past century. The exclusive pursuit of their first preference has rarely been the best way for these actors to promote their interests. But by modifying their preferences in various ways, linking them with other issues, referring them to other decision-making bodies, maintaining silence about them, or – on the few occasions when this is considered suitable in spite of everything – by uncompromisingly arguing their case in order to force their opponent into retreat, the winners of these games have managed to increase their influence on impending decisions.

What should be our attitude toward such strategic action in politics? Is it an acceptable means of achieving political goals? Or is it a morally dubious undertaking that only reinforces our “contempt for politicians,” to use a phrase that is fashionable in Sweden today?