THE VOTER'S PARADOX

In more than seventy years, only one political party has succeeded in attracting a majority of the Swedish electorate during peacetime: In 1968 the Social Democrats received 50.1 percent of the vote. Two years later, their share of the total vote fell by nearly 5 percent. Whereas democratic theory has been based on the assumption that the majority makes decisions, political practice has meant government through coalitions or other agreements between various minorities. As a result, politics has largely become a tug-of-war among parties with differing views. Those who currently belong to the winning coalition must constantly weigh their positions on a variety of issues. How far can they pursue their own policy without destroying their cooperation? How valuable is their coalition as such? How should parliamentary successes, extracted at the cost of concessions on substantive issues, be weighed against the voters' reward for pursuing a consistent policy? The level of political drama was heightened in the 1970s by the Swedish constitutional reform, which introduced a unicameral system and strictly proportional representation. Under these circumstances, the Swedes have seen their politics increasingly turn into a game of bargaining among minorities. Politics has become a series of deals and compromises, surprising initiatives and sudden shifts in the structure of majorities, agonized indecision and sweaty press conferences.