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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- PART I Disaggregating Ideas in American Foreign Policy
- PART II US Foreign Policy and Mass Atrocities in the Balkans
- PART III US Foreign Policy and Terrorism
- PART IV Obama and Mass Atrocities in the Middle East
- PART V ‘America First’ and the Use of Force
- PART VI Conclusions
- Notes
- References
- Index
7 - Syria: ‘There Was No Benghazi To Be Saved’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 May 2022
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- PART I Disaggregating Ideas in American Foreign Policy
- PART II US Foreign Policy and Mass Atrocities in the Balkans
- PART III US Foreign Policy and Terrorism
- PART IV Obama and Mass Atrocities in the Middle East
- PART V ‘America First’ and the Use of Force
- PART VI Conclusions
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
As commitments in Libya wound down, Obama would revert to his initial preference of restraint in matters of foreign policy. However, he would be faced by another, much more complex situation as Syria, too, entered into civil war in March 2011. By 2012, the civil war was in full swing. Casualties began to mount as did the number of civilians seeking to flee the violence. Within a matter of months, the Syrian civil war became one of the most pressing threats to peace and stability within the region. As the war escalated, concerns emerged over the growing humanitarian crisis and fears that the Assad regime might resort to using chemical weapons against rebel forces and civilians began to grow.
The potential threat of the use of chemical weapons would prompt Obama to declare a ‘red line’, stating that if Assad used such weapons, this would change his equation of the use of force (Obama, 2012). Nearly one year after making this declaration, the world witnessed the deadliest chemical weapons attack since in the Iran-Iraq war. The attack took place in Ghouta, in the eastern suburbs of Damascus on 21 August 2013. Early estimates suggested that over 1,400 people were killed (White House, 2013). Many of the victims were women and children. Images and videos of the dead, dying and maimed spread around the world, sparking both horror and outrage. Despite the horrific nature of the attack, Obama backed down from the threat of military force, fearing entanglement. What makes this stand-down particularly puzzling is that there was broad support from both Republicans and Democrats, as well as from military leaders advising the administration, for the use of force.
In this chapter, I work to explain this stand-down, arguing that in contrast to Libya, Obama ‘repressed’ principled sources of information following the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta. In the first section, I provide a brief background of the Syrian conflict as well as the Obama administration's early response. In doing so, I highlight some of the early debates that emerged concerning the potential use of force in Syria.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign PolicyPresidential Decision-Making in a Post-Cold War World, pp. 117 - 132Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2021