Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Notes on contributors
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Towards a history of humanitarian intervention
- Part I Early modern precedents
- Part II The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire
- Part III Intervening in Africa
- Part IV Non-European states
- 13 Humanitarian intervention, democracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898, and after
- 14 The innovation of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment
- 15 Fraternal aid, self-defence, or self-interest? Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, 1978–1989
- Part V Postscript
- Index
13 - Humanitarian intervention, democracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898, and after
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 April 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Notes on contributors
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Towards a history of humanitarian intervention
- Part I Early modern precedents
- Part II The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire
- Part III Intervening in Africa
- Part IV Non-European states
- 13 Humanitarian intervention, democracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898, and after
- 14 The innovation of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment
- 15 Fraternal aid, self-defence, or self-interest? Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, 1978–1989
- Part V Postscript
- Index
Summary
[T]he American people never shirk a responsibility and never unload a burden that carries forward civilization. We accepted war for humanity. We can accept no terms of peace which shall not be in the interest of humanity. [Great applause]
William McKinley, October 1898Ambassador (later Secretary of State) John Hay's remark that the American war with Spain in 1898 was a ‘splendid little war’ is well known. His next phrase, ‘begun with the highest motives’ is not. President William McKinley repeatedly defined the war as humanitarian. It was ‘a triumph of our humanity’ begun ‘for freedom and to relieve our neighbors of oppression’. One recent commentator sees in human rights ‘one of the primary reasons why the United States went to war with Spain’, although this ignored ‘the contradiction inherent in the joint pursuit of democracy, a dynamic concept, and stability, a static one’. In September 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented on commitments in Latin America: ‘to protect security, defend democracy, and refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of other American nations, a prescription, it might seem, for inaction … or sacrifice of one of our purposes or principles in pursuing others’. The McKinley administration went to war to free Cuba. It then limited freedom in former Spanish colonies. I shall argue that a core of humanitarian principles informed both decisions, but also stimulated opposition to the second.
Intervention presented as purely self-interested or purely humanitarian did not command enough support to force war.
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- Humanitarian InterventionA History, pp. 303 - 322Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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