Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Facing Europe: November 1958–December 1960
- 2 The First Applications: January 1961–September 1964
- 3 The Surcharge Crisis: October 1964–May 1966
- 4 Towards the Community: June 1966–May 1967
- 5 Dealing with Rejection: May 1967–December 1968
- 6 The Road to Enlargement: January 1969–October 1972
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
Conclusions
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Facing Europe: November 1958–December 1960
- 2 The First Applications: January 1961–September 1964
- 3 The Surcharge Crisis: October 1964–May 1966
- 4 Towards the Community: June 1966–May 1967
- 5 Dealing with Rejection: May 1967–December 1968
- 6 The Road to Enlargement: January 1969–October 1972
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Enlargement of the EEC on 1 January 1973 constituted an extraordinary landmark in contemporary British and Danish history. At a practical level, of course, accession was a welcome moment of pause in what had at times been a gruelling and rather acrimonious process. The question of acceding to the Community had indeed managed to suck up much of the political oxygen in London and Copenhagen for well over a decade; now the matter appeared finally to have been resolved. Far more fundamental, however, was that the successful fruition of the British and Danish bids marked the ultimate acknowledgement that the path of integration embarked upon by the Six had essentially been the right one. Having long prioritised relations beyond the confines of the EEC and alternative frameworks of cooperation with it, the signing of the Accession Treaty in January 1972 and its coming into force twelve months later represented the bookend of a period of readjustment in Britain and Denmark's views of themselves and the world around them. And yet enlargement was also a transition that would condemn both countries to years of further debate and self-examination about how far they each ought to be embroiled in an organisation set to take on an ever more overt political, economic and social character. An intense and arduous chapter had doubtless come to a close, but still more substantial and sour episodes stood in the offing.
The sheer exhaustion of the referendum campaign and the bitterness of the debates that surrounded it left an immediate mark on the SD. Krag was the first major casualty. It was just three days after the 2 October vote, following nearly seven years as prime minister and over 11 years as SD leader, that he chose to resign. But there did not end the acrimony. Krag's successor, trade unionist Anker Jørgensen, would immediately face a rebellion from SD parliamentarians who redoubled their criticisms of the Community's institutions and the general direction in which economic and monetary union was heading. Much of the next year was subsequently spent playing down the domestic ramifications of entry. Amid continuing internal turmoil, however, something was always going to give, and in the general election of December 1973 the SD lost a third of its seats and with it the right to form a government. This merely emboldened those already dissatisfied with the new status quo.
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- Harold Wilson, Denmark and the Making of Labour European Policy , pp. 237 - 254Publisher: Liverpool University PressPrint publication year: 2017